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CASE -NOTES-
TAxA.TIo0. - PARTTNERSHIPS.---VALIDITY OF TE .FAmIL" PAnTN ISMup,
Partners, CoQn and .Culbertson, .Texas ranchers, .agred that. the parter.-
ship should sell out to'Culbertsbn upon conditiori lie form a new partner-
ship with his four sons, who were 24, 22, 18 and 16 years of age respec-
tively. This was 'done and tulbertseon took a note in payment of the boys'
undivided half interest. The note was later partly paid with profits and
the remainder forgiven as a gift. Except when at school the sons intended
to give their services and to share in the control and management of the
ranch. However, the two older sons were called into the army before this
arrangement could be put in effect. The two younger sons attended school
during the winter and worked on the ranch during the summer. In 1940
and 1941 partnership income tax returns were filed which showed a divi-
sion of profits approximating capital contributions. The commissioner of
internal revenue ruled the family partnership invalid for tax purposes
and attributed the entire income to the father, Culbertson, under Sections
11 and 22 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Code, and accordingly found a
deficiency in Culbertson's income tax return. The Tax Court, in W. 0.
Culbertson, 1947 P-H TC Memorandum Decisions, Par. 47,168, held for
the commissioner of internal revenue, finding that the sons contributed
neither "vital services" nor "original capital" to the partnership as sup-
posedly required by Commissioner of Internat Revenue v. Tower, 327
U. S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946).
Deeming an intention to contribute time and services in the future suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of the Tower and Lusthaus cases, the
Fifth Circuit court reversed the decision. Culbertson v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1948). On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court,
in its first consideration of the family partnership since the Tower and
Lusthaua opinions, reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case to
the Tax Court, making it clear that both courts erred. Commieioner of
Internal Revenue v. Culber-ton,-60 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949). "The question is
not whether the services or capital contributed by a partner are of suffi-
cient importance to meet some objective standard supposedly established
by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the facts. . . the parties
in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together
in the present conduct of the enterprise." 69 Sup. Ct. 1210, 1214.
The case could easily have been distinguished from the Tower and
Lustha;;s decisions in that the sons in substance acquired Coon's existing
partnership interest and there was no splitting of their father's income.
Durwood v. Com issioner, 159 F. 2d 400 (8th Cir 1947); Sine B. For-
sythe, 10 T.C. 417 (1948). But cf. Nordling v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d
703 (9th Cir. 1948). However the court recognized this as merely one of
the facts to be considered in determining the intent of the parties, which
is the basic issue.
Intent of the parties has always been determinative of the partnership
relation. See, e.g., Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 56
(I4).4.Meebt.v.__eniine.145. U.S. 611, 621-(1892)-; Barker v. Kraft,
259 Mich. '70, 242 N.W. 841 (1932).; Zubak v. B.akmaz,.346. Pa. 279,. 29
A.2d 473 (1f943); 6f. Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194 29 NW. 2d 271 (1947);
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Lowry v.,Kvanaugh,822 Mich. 532, 84 N.W. 2d 61 (1948). This is neces-
sarily so because partnership arises out of a contract, express or implied,
between the parties.: Cook -v. Carpenter, 84 Vt. 121, 80 Am. Dec. 670
(1861); MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSmP, Sec. 4 (2d ed.)
1920) ; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Sec. 21 (1932). But intent can only
be shown by objective conduct and actions. Belcher v. Commissioner, 162
F. 2d 974 (5th Cir. 1947); James L. Robertson, 20 B.T.A. 112 (1930);
4 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, Sec. 33.05 and
33.06: (1984); see Annotation, 131 A.L.R. 550 (1940). The Bureau of
Internal Revenue's most recent statement of policy upon the family part-
nership recognizes this. I.T. 3845, 1947-1, Cue. Bull. 66. Since objective
factors indicate state of mind which in turn is determinative of partner-
ship, it follows that objective factors are the basis for decision. See Veron,
Tiaation of Income of Family Partnerships, 59 HABv. L. Rav. 209, 274
(1945).
Following the Tower and Lusthaus decisions, the courts have repeat-
edly -fastened upon concepts of "vital services," "original capital," and
"control and management" as conclusive "tests" of partnership. See, e.g.,
Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948); Rupple v. Kuhl,
81 F. Supp. 318 (E. DO Wis. 1948); Simmons v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d
220 (5th Cir. 1947); Weinstein v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 81 (6th Cir.
1948) ; David L. Jennings, 10 T.C. 505 (1948) ; Walter F. Seidel, 10 T. C.
1135 (1948); Jay A. Mount, 1946 P-H TC Memorandum Decisions, Par.
46,276; W. R. Winchester, 1947 P-H TC Memorandum Decisions, Par.
47,073. The instant opinion clearly indicates that these "tests" are not
conclusive. Accordingly a failure to fulfill these tests will not dictate a
decision against the taxpayer. Of course, Income cannot be attributed to a
partner unless he has supplied the ingredients of income -:- capital or
services, or both. Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330, 884 (U.S. 1859);
Eimsnr '. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S.
111 (1930); Max German, 2 T.C. 474 (1943). But services need not be
"vital" and capital need not be "original" if other considerations show a
bona fide intent to carry on business in partnership. See Veron, Taxation
of Ineome-of Family Partnerships, supra, at 265; Mannheimer and Mook,
A Taxzwie Evaluation of Family Partnerships, 2 IowA L. Rz.486, 447(1947).
Determining subjective intent is admittedly; difficult, Edginton v. Fitz-
maurive; stzpra at 483, andevery cage must bd decided upon its own facts.
Wboslea v. Cemissioer , 118 F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948); Appel v. Smith,
161 F. 2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947).. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Bureau
and the courts suspect collusive hidden agreements, and every family
arrangement reducing taxes is subjected to special scrutiny. Helvering v.
Clifford 809 U. S. 33i (1940) r . Comrm ioner, 150 F. 2d.915.(10th
Cir. 1940); Byerly v*. Commissioner .14 F . 2d 879 (6th Cit. !946);
Veron;- 2ka. i of' Iworae of Family Partnerchipe, supra, at 2171 Millet,
Some Remult# of the Supreme (Nurt DWpaIB.irtePan l 4Vn6Isp
Cases, 19 TENN. L. Ray. 510, 513 (1940). This uncertaintyis underlined bsy
the instant'opinion; imay jive added impetus to proposals for wpandfig
the-present husband-wife tncome-splitting provisions, 96 .U.S.CA. Nit.
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Rev..-Code,. Sec. 12(g), into .a family income tax +return. See.Proposals
for Preventing Family Tax Avoidance, 57 YALE L. J. 788, 803 (1948)..
DAVm KESSLER,
Second Year Law Student.
TORTS - THEATERS AND SHOWS - AssuMPTION OF RISK. Plaintiff
sustained injuries from a flying puck while she was watching a hockey
contest in an arena owned and operated by the defendant. The thirty-
seven year old plaintiff in this negligence action had previously attended
several hockey games, had a brother who played hockey, and was shown
to :be familiar with the general terms and purpose of the game. No evi-
dence was introduced that the plaintiff could not have taken a protected
seat back of the wire netting behind either goal had she so desired, her
ticket allowing her the choice of entire seating area. From a verdict in
the trial court for the plaintiff, the defendant. on alternative motion for
judgment or a new trial was granted motion for judgment. On plaintiffs
appeal held that judgment for defendant be affirmed. The plaintiff by
sitting in an unscreened area had assumed risks of injury incident to the
contest. The rule of law applied in baseball games is applicable since
hockey is played to such an extent in Minnesota that dangers incident to
attending a game arematters of common knowledge which- a person
atending is'presumed to comprehend. Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn.
564, 29 N.W. 2d 453 (1947).
The effect of the instant case is to broaden the risk of injury assumed
by the hockey patron-to coincide with that assumed by the baseball spec-
tator. See Comment, 31 MARQ. L. Rzv. 298 (1948>. Courts uniformly. deny
recovery to baseball spectators injured while sitting in unprotected seate
on the ground that baseball is so well known that its risks are a matter
of common knowledge which the patron will be held as a matter of law to
appreciate, and-in taking an unprotected seat assumes the risk of injuries
incident to the game. -Quinn v. Recreztion-Park A-s'n,..3 Cal. 2d 725, 46
P. 2d 144 (1935); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball:& Athletic Ass'n,186
Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932); Crane v. Kansas City Baseball &Ex-
hibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301. 153 S.W. 1076 (1913) ; 24 CALI. L. REv.
429 11936). Some courts indicatethat the defense of contributory negli-
gence- ai.ay be invoked barring recovery where'the Plaintiff has :not exer-
cised reasonable care in view of the foreseeable risk. Grimes v. American
League Baseball Co., 78 S.W. 2d 520 (Mo. 1935); Kav fan . Seattle
BasebaU Club Ass'n, 105 Wash. 215, 177 Pac. 776, rev'4, 181 Pac. 679
(1919) ; Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibiton Co., supra The
holding-in the principal case is opposed to the decisions of the majority
of jurisdictions who have been faced with the question, yet there is rea-
soned authoriy in accord with the Minnesota view. ingersoll v. Onondaga
Hoc-key Club Inc., 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. Supp. 505, 11 NotR DbmE
LAw. 93 (1935).; Hammel tv. Madison Square Garden Corp., 156 Misc. 311,
279 N. Y. Supp.815 (1935) 17 BOSTON U. L. REV. 485 (1937); See annot.
149 A.L.R. 1174. The majority of courts have refused to hold that the
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dangers incident to attending a hockey contest are so well known as to.
constitutecomnion knowledge which the patron will be held to comprehend
as'. a'matter of law. Shuivman v. Fresno Ice Rink, 205 P. 2d 77 (Calif;.
1949); Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.Wi 2d 90, 149
A.L.R. 1164. (1943); James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, 60 R.I. 405,::199"
AtI. 293.: (1938); Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296.
Mass. 168, 5 N.E. 2d 1 (1936); See 149 A.L.R. 1179. They regard it:in-..
stead as a question of fact to be determined'by the jury after a considera-
tion of all the evidence. James v. Rhode Island Auditorium,. supra; Shen-
ney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., supra A recent decision.
declared that it is up to the jury to determine whether defendant was
negligent in not providing either notices warning the patrons of danger.
from flying -pucks, or; screens to protect the spectators. Shurman v. Fres-
no Ice Rink, supra Also the size and type of the auditorium may be con-
sidered in comparison. with others used for the same purpose but such!
evidence is not conclusive as establishing negligence. Tite v. Omaha Coli-
seum, Corp.,*supra; James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, supra. Where-the.
patron -of any amusement occupies an unprotected seat with full knowl-
edge of the risks involved and thus exposes himself to danger of injury,
it is well settled that he assumes the risk of injuries incident to the con-
test as a maitter of law, Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, supra; Brisson v.
Minneapolii Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, supra; PiOSSER, TORTS 383.
(1941) ; 24 CALiF.. L.: REv. 429, 433, even though such seat is only tempo-.
rary while waiting for the usher to find one protected, Quinn v. RecreoAion
Park Ass'n, supra, and even where the patron is hit on his way to his seat
it has been held that such risk of injury is assumed. Blackhall v. Albany
Baseball& Amusement Co., Inc. 157 Misc. 801, 285 N.Y.Supp. 695 (1936);
Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co. Inc., 16 La. App. 95,
133 So. 408 (1931). If such dangers would have been obvious to a person
of ordinary intelligence under the same circumstances, the patron, even
though unaware will be held to have assumed the risk, thereby relieving
the proprietor of the duty to exercise protective care toward the patron.
Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., supra; Ingersoll v. Omondaga Hockey Club
.In., supra; PaossEm, TORTS 377, 383 (1941). But see Lemotne v.
Sprinfield Hockey Ass'n, 307 Mass. 102, 29 N. E. 2d 716 (1940). The
patron does not assume the risk of hidden or undisclosed dangers which he
had no reason to anticipate, BOHLEN, Voluntary Assumption of Risk,
20 Hav. L. REv. 14 (1906), such as a defective screen. Edling v. Exhibi-
tion Co., 181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S.W. 908 (1914). There is unanimity that
the proprietor of an athletic game or contest is not the insurer of the
safety of the patron, Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., supra; Beverly Beach
Club Inc. v. Marron, 172 Md. 471, 192 At. 278 (1937); Rich v. Madison
Square Garden Corp., 149 Misc. 123, 266 N.Y.Supp. 288 (1933), aff'd, 241
App. Div. 722, 270 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1934), nor is he required to anticipate
improbable results, Rich v. Madison Square Garden Corp., supra (recov-
ery denied where player after being "body checked" thrust hockey stick in
patron's face), but instead the proprietor has only the duty of exercising
ordinary and reasonable care to protect the spectators from harms of
which the proprietor has knowledge or those of which he should be rea-
sonably aware. Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, supra; Chardon v.
216'
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Alavied Park Co.,.1 Cal. App. 2d 756, 36 P. 2d 136 (1934); Phillips v
Butte Jockey Club & Fair -Ass'n, 46 Mont. 838, 127 Pac.: 1011 -(1912)..
He is required to provide screened seats for only, those who might be
expected to apply for them on an ordinary occasion. Hammel v. Madison-
Squaire. Garden Corp., supra; Quinn :t. Recreation Park Aas'n, 8uWra;.
Brisson V. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, supra, :In fact the
patron has the-duty to use reasonable care to protect himself from injuries
of which he has knowledge or would be apparent to theaverage person.
Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., supra; Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey
Ass'n, supra; James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, supra.
,.The trend of decisions as illustrated by the principal ease is to. extend
the application of the doctrine of volenti non fit injuri - no wrong is
done to one who consents. It can be predicted that as the general public
becomes more familiar with ice hockey the rule of law applied in baseball
cases will be applied to hockey.
Tort actions by spectators against state educational institutions will
generally fail due to state immunity, and even where the school has cre-
ated an athletic governing body, e.g , University of North Dakota, the
doctrine will ordinarily be extended barring recovery. Anderson a. Board
of Edu'ation of -Fargo, 49 N.D. 181, 190 N.W. 807 (1922); PROSSER,
ToRTs 1065 (1941) ; 28 CALIF. L. REV. 237 (1940) (school immunity criti-
cized); See annotation, 160 A.L.R. 7. Of course, the state-may assume
liability by statute absent constitutional prohibition. Mills V. Steoart,
76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926) ; Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 128 S.E.
172 (1925).
DAvI R. LowELm
Second Year Law Student.
